Introduction
The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (hereafter: UCP Directive) 2 aims to combat unfair commercial practices in business-to-consumer transactions. Traders who engage in unfairly influencing consumers by aggressive or misleading practices may distort consumers' economic choice-making. By countering such practices, the Directive attempts to fortify consumer choice and the fair operation of business-to-consumer markets. This chapter offers an introduction and analysis of the UCP Directive. First, an outline of the Directive is provided (para 2) after which the key elements of the Directive are introduced (paras 3 and 4). Then, the relationship between the UCP Directive and other European Directives as well as national laws on fair competition and consumer protection is discussed in light of the broad scope and the maximum harmonisation principle which underlies the UCP Directive (paras 5 and 6). Further, certain aspects of enforcement of the UCP Directive are considered (para 7). After these mostly descriptive sections of the chapter, some further attention is devoted to one of the main themes running through the UCP Directive, namely the tension between championing self-reliance of 'average consumers' and offering protection against certain unsavoury practices (para 8). Moreover, in conclusion some unresolved issues and matters meriting further research are discussed (para 9). A bibliography completes the chapter (para 10).
Outline of the Directive
The UCP Directive is a general horizontal framework Directive with maximum harmonisation character. The Directive aims to combat unfair commercial practices in marketing, sales and after-Briefly described, the UCP Directive is built up as follows. First, it sets out a general prohibition of unfair commercial practices generally (article 5), followed by specific prohibitions of misleading actions and omissions (article 6-7) and aggressive practices (article 8-9). Annex I to the Directive contains a list of 'blacklisted' practices deemed misleading or aggressive per se. Furthermore, the Directive contains rules on self-regulatory codes of conduct (article 10) and on enforcement and sanctions (article [11] [12] [13] . 5 Thus, the UCP Directive regime also applies to regulated products such as medicinal products; cf. ECJ 16 July 2015, Cases C-544/13 and C-545/13 (Apoteket Farmaci) . 6 According to article 2 (k) UPC Directive, 'transactional decision' denotes 'any decision taken by a consumer concerning whether, how and on what terms to purchase, make payment in whole or in part for, retain or dispose of a product or to exercise a contractual right in relation to the product, whether the consumer decides to act or to refrain from acting'. 7 Article 2 (d) UCP Directive. 8 See Article 3 (1) UCP Directive. 9 Indeed, according to ECJ 16 April 2015, Case C-288/13 (Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság / UPC Magyarország Kft.) , the unfair practice can consist of one single case rather than a multitude of cases. So, even a one-off instance of the provision of erroneous information can constitute a practice in the sense of the UCP Directive.
Advertising Directive, which is now restricted in application to business-to-business practices of misleading and comparative advertising. 
Unfair commercial practices
The general clause of article 5 UCP Directive prohibits the use of commercial practices which are both contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer with regard to a product or a service. 11 Note that article 5 serves as a 'safety net' since there is no further need to test article 5 when a practice can be categorised as misleading or aggressive for the application of article 6 and following.
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The normative yardstick of 'professional diligence' is open-textured. According to article 2 (h) it refers to 'the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader's field of activity'. 13 The 'professional diligence' standard is a normative yardstick of care or competence. 14 It does not prescribe a requirement of taste and decency. 15 In article 2 (e) UCP Directive, the notion of 'material distortion' is defined as the impairment of the ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. This notion of causality is not factual but hypothetical since it asks what the average consumer, the 'reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumer' 16 , would have done not what actual consumers have done or would have done. Obviously, the yardstick of the average consumer refers to a nonexistent human model. To complicate matters, the Commission has asserted that it is a normative instead of a statistical yardstick. 17 In my opinion, this is unsatisfactory because it creates a disincentive for courts and enforcers to properly investigate how markets really work and it introduces (or continues) the risk that decisions on how average consumers would or would not react to commercial practices are mere conjecture and far off the empirical mark.
Misleading and aggressive practices
Misleading practices consist of misleading actions and misleading omissions. According to article 6 UCP Directive, there are basically three types of misleading actions:
18 1) giving false, untruthful or deceptive information, 2) creating confusion with competitors' products, trademarks, names and distinguishing marks, and 3) non-compliance with firm and verifiable commitments contained in a code of conduct to which the trader indicated he was bound.
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The first and main category of misleading actions comprises acts of giving false, untruthful or deceptive information which deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct ad thus causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would otherwise not have taken. The misleading information can relate to the product, its existence, nature, characteristics, price, or to other circumstances such as trader identity, qualifications or relevant consumer rights.
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According to article 7 UCP Directive, an omission is misleading if it omits or discloses in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner, material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise. 21 Any decision directly related to the decision whether or not to purchase a product is covered by the concept of 'transactional decision'.
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Failure to identify the commercial intent of the commercial practice is also misleading if this intent is not already apparent from the context. 23 Article 7 (4) furthermore imposes a positive duty on traders to disclose certain information when they make 'an invitation to purchase' to a consumer. 24 The listed items of information include, e.g., main characteristics of the product, price inclusive of taxes. Moreover, article 7 (5) provides that 'information requirements established by Community law in relation to commercial communication' is to be disclosed as well. A non-exhaustive list of such Community rules is laid down in Annex II to the Directive. The result of all this is that non-compliance 18 See article 6 (1) and (2) with these specific (and mostly pre-contractual) information duties is deemed an unfair commercial practice. Aggressive practices are those which in their factual context, taking account of all features and circumstances, by harassment, coercion, use of physical force, or undue influence, significantly impair or are likely to significantly impair the average consumer's freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the product and thereby causes him or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would otherwise not have taken. The use of psychological pressure such as the exploitation of vulnerability or discouraging the average consumers from asserting their rights is also considered to constitute an aggressive practice. 25 For example, traders who introduce artificial obstacles for consumers to terminate their contracts and switch to other traders or to exercise their contractual rights may thus commit aggressive practices.
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Annex I to the Directive consists of a 'black list' of practices considered unfair under any circumstances. 27 The blacklisted practices are deemed unfair in the sense that no further evidence of unfairness, misleading or aggressive nature is required. The list covers 23 misleading and 8 aggressive practices. For example, deemed misleading is a commercial practice which describes "a product as 'gratis', 'free', 'without charge' or similar, if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item". 28 In Purely Creative, the ECJ was called to construe Annex I, para. 31, according to which a commercial practice which creates 'the false impression that the consumer has already won, will win, or will on doing a particular act win, a prize or other equivalent benefit, when in fact either there is no prize or other equivalent benefit, or taking any action in relation to claiming the prize or other equivalent benefit is subject to the consumer paying money or incurring a cost' (prize draw and lottery scams) is deemed aggressive. The Court held that in applying this rule, it is irrelevant that the cost imposed on the consumer is de minimis compared with the value of the prize. Furthermore, the prize draw can even be deemed aggressive if the consumer has a number of methods by which he may claim the prize, of which at least one is free of charge, if, according to one or more of the proposed methods, the consumer would incur a cost in order to obtain information on the prize or how to acquire it. 
Maximum harmonization principle
The UCP Directive follows the maximum harmonization principle. 30 So, national legislation offering less or more protection to consumers is in contravention of EU law. As a result, some member states were obliged to repeal existing protective measures such as specific price listing regulations while others found that national rules specifying the format of certain pre-contractual information overstepped the maximum harmonisation boundaries. The underlying rationale of maximum harmonisation character of the UCP Directive is that this guarantees a pan-European level playing field by creating legal certainty and a fair balance between traders' duties and consumers' rights. 32 To a large extent, the matter of maximum harmonisation turns on whether the general clauses and the Annex of the UCP Directive may be supplemented by national rules which are more concrete in nature. However, the generic scope of the Directive is not exceptionally well demarcated. 33 The scope is such that it may cut through various national legal fields and doctrines, such as laws of 'market practices' in economic law and contract law doctrines of mistake, misrepresentation, duress, fraud, deceit, and even through related areas such as the field of economic torts. Moreover, one can question the efficacy of maximum harmonisation through a horizontal Directive which has such a broad-brushed sphere of application and whose general clauses of unfairness ultimately need a case-by-case application at national level. 34 Therefore, it is important to review the exceptions to the maximum harmonisation character.
Firstly, the relationship between the UCP Directive and sector-specific or product-specific rules is as follows. In case of conflict between provisions of the UCP Directive and other Community rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices, the latter take precedence (article 3 (4)).
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For instance, EU regulation 1008/2008 on Air Services sets particular rules on information disclosure in the online sales of airline tickets. Because of their more specified nature, these rules take priority over the general pre-contractual information duties laid down in the UCP Directive. 36 This priority also applies in case the specific EU rules are of a minimum harmonization character. Secondly, according to article 3 (8) UCP Directive both national and EU rules on establishment or authorisation of regulated professions as well as the deontological codes and rules that uphold standards of integrity of these professionals, are exempt from maximum harmonisation. Thirdly, the UCP Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract (article 3 (2)).
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Fourthly, in the domain of financial services and immovable property the UCP Directive is of minimum harmonisation (Article 3 (9) UCP Directive). The reasoning for this exception was that the complexity and risks surrounding financial products and markets may require more detailed rules harmonisation character of the UCP Directive on issues of pre-contractual information duties has become unsustainable in light of article 5 (4) and Recital (12) The sixth and final exception to the maximum harmonisation character of the UCP Directive lies in its aim. Since the central aim of the Directive is the protection of consumers against unfair commercial practices, the question is whether national rules which impose more (or more specific) restrictions on commercial practices in order to protect other interests than consumer interests are excluded from the sphere of application of the Directive. For instance, what if a national legislature bans certain practices with a view of the protection of fair competition between competitors or the protection of employees? In Pelckmans Turnhout, the ECJ ruled that national provisions pursuing objectives not related to consumer protection are outside the scope of the Directive.
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The restrictions that maximum harmonisation imposes on Member States is most acutely felt in relation to the blacklist (Annex I). There, the general clauses on unfair, misleading and aggressive practices have been supplemented by a list of specific prohibitions. The ECJ has ruled on numerous occasions that the blacklist is exhaustive and that the Directive does not allow categorical prohibitions of other practices at national level. The basic idea is that 'it was essential to overcome the specific legal barriers caused by the fragmented regulation of unfair commercial practices, which gave rise to cost, complexity and uncertainty for both businesses and consumers'. 44 Instead, national authorities and courts are only allowed to decide on a case by case basis whether other practices than those banned in the blacklist are unfair, misleading or aggressive. On that basis, the ECJ has ruled that the following national rules are incompatible with the UCP Directive: Therefore, the Annex is exhaustive and Member States are not allowed to introduce or maintain their own list of unfair practices. How this rigid stance is to be reconciled with the scope of application and exceptions to the maximum harmonisation principle, is not entirely clear. What if a black list is part of the national contract law regime (e.g, 'a contract following a combined offer is voidable'), or aims at protecting both consumer interests and the fair operation of markets generally?
Relationship with other EU rules of consumer protection
Given the generic scope of the UCP Directive, there are several points of contact between the UCP Directive and other EU rules consumer protection. Here, I briefly review these relationships. As already mentioned above, the UCP Directive itself formulates a priority rule for other Community rules regulating specific aspects of unfair commercial practices (article 3 (4)). This is relevant where the UCP Directive merely formulates vague standards and dedicated EU rules are more specific, e.g., where concrete rule-based provisions offer more guidance than the UCP Directive does in terms of how traders should behave in their marketing practices. 50 Note, however, where such specific EU rules do not exist, purely national rules may prove to be in violation of the maximum harmonisation character of the UCP Directive. As far as information duties under the UCP Directive is concerned, article 7 provides that in the case of a so-called 'invitation to purchase', 51 'Information requirements established by Community law in relation to commercial communication including advertising or marketing, a non-exhaustive list of which is contained in Annex II, shall be regarded as material'. This means that when a trader makes an 'invitation to purchase', he shall provide the consumer with information, if not already apparent from the context, deemed material by Community law in relation to commercial communication. Annex II to the UCP Directive refers to information duties laid down in several articles of fourteen specific Directives. Thus, the UCP Directive provides that non-compliance with those specific information duties constitutes an unfair commercial practice, which brings these duties within the national enforcement framework concerning unfair commercial practices.
A further interesting relationship is the one between the UCP Directive and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13. 52 In it 2012 Pereničová decision, the ECJ held that unfairness of a certain contract practice in the sense of the UCP Directive does not by necessity cause the contract to be 'not binding on the consumer' in the sense of article 6(1) of Directive 93/13. 53 Thus, it seems that using unfair contract terms in itself is not an unfair commercial practice; courts should fully investigate the consequences of such use in light of the specific circumstances.
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A latest addition to the consumer acquis is the 2011 Consumer Rights Directive (CR Directive). 55 In several respects, the CR Directive and the UCP Directive overlap. For instance, both Directives lay down similar rules on material information that needs to be provided prior to entry into contract.
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Moreover, the CR Directive supplements the UCP Directive in respect of inertia selling (unsolicited deliveries). Such practices are prohibited under both Directives but in addition to the prohibition under Article 5(5) and point 29 of Annex I UCP Directive, article 27 CR Directive provides a contractual remedy by exempting the consumer from the obligation to provide any consideration for such unsolicited supply or provision. 
Enforcement
The method of enforcement is by and large left to the discretion of Member States. Article 11 UCP Directive sets out that Member States shall implement adequate and effective means to combat unfair commercial practices in order to enforce compliance, e.g., by means of powers conferred on courts or administrative authorities to issue stopping orders, prohibitive injunctions, publication and rectification orders, et cetera. It is left to the discretion of Member States to choose the exact form of the enforcement mechanisms, as long as it offers recourse to an administrative or judicial procedure to those persons and organizations having a legitimate interest, which includes competitors. 58 According to article 13 UCP Directive, Member States shall also ensure that a system for sanctioning unfair commercial practices. This needs to be a system of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. The implementation techniques vary considerably. For instance, the Member States employ a wide range of enforcement methods against a background of diverging enforcement styles and cultures. In the UK, the Directive was implemented through the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008 (SI /1277 . 60 These Regulations did not introduce any form of individual redress to consumers but merely a system of administrative enforcement orders and criminal law sanctions. 61 However, recently proposed amendment of the Regulations introduces certain rights for consumers, including the right to unwind, the right to a discount and the right to damages. 62 In other countries, such as Germany, private enforcement by (subsidized) private associations with standing to sue for injunction is traditionally the main form of enforcement. 63 Again other legal systems have an enforcement practice which combines public authority market monitoring with private consumer association bargaining, settling and litigating strategies. In its recent review, the EC has taken the view that at this stage it is not appropriate to amend the UCP Directive substantively. It has, however, voiced concerns over enforcement efforts and effectiveness of these efforts in targeting particularly problematic practices. 
Protection and self-reliance
The core of the UCP Directive lies in the information paradigm: by assuring a flow of correct and meaningful information, transactional decisions of 'average consumers' are undistorted and can therefore be assumed to be taken in accordance with consumer preferences. 65 From this perspective, economic framework, the UCP Directive is geared towards empowering rather than restraining this 'homo economicus' in its transactional decision-making processes. 67 However, the Directive does not only revolve around 'average consumers' since it also refers to particular consumers who are vulnerable "to the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity". 68 Therefore, the UCP Directive oscillates between two objectives, namely empowerment of of self-reliant and autonomous consumers (i.e., 'average' consumers) and protection of 'vulnerable average consumers' (whatever that may mean). With regard to the first objective, the Directive subscribes to the information paradigm which aims at fortifying autonomy and emphasizing individual responsibility. On the other hand, the Directive attains the protection of consumers generally and vulnerable consumers in particular against traders who exploit their superior knowledge on consumer behaviour and human deficiencies. Obviously, the question is what makes consumers vulnerable in connection with commercial practices. Given the many human traits and deficiencies of ordinary consumers laid bare by psychological and marketing studies, one could argue that all consumers are vulnerable individuals and as such deserve some form of protection. 69 By contrast, it is sometimes said that consumers should take more responsibility for their decisions. For example, in discharging its duties, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), is under a duty to apply a number of principles including the principle 'that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions ' (s. 3B FSMA 2000) . This sounds stern but what does it actually mean in markets where products are difficult to comprehend to begin with, are deliberately made even more complex, and where consumers are short-sighted, inert and/or literally or figuratively illiterate? As a consequence, national courts called to apply the UCP framework may find that in fact it offers less potential for redress to consumers than national doctrines such as mistake, fraud and tort do. Thus, they may be tempted to avoid the straight-jacket of maximum harmonisation by resorting to such national private law doctrines. Since the UCP Directive is without prejudice to contract law 70 -or perhaps even broader: the law of obligations? -
Unresolved aspects and further research
Given the wide ambit of the Directive and its general horizontal nature, a number of controversial aspects become apparent when studying the Directive. In the previous paragraphs some of these aspects were already identified. For instance, paragraph 4 exemplified the problematic issues caused by the interplay of the broad general horizontal scope of the UCP Directive and its underlying maximum harmonisation principle. Future research would do well to venture further into this area and analyse from a comparative perspective the various restrictions set by the UCP Directive to national laws of fair competition. This could increase our understanding of the incursions the UCP Directive has made in the different countries and the impact it has had on the various legal doctrines. The same applies to the embedding -where applicable -of the core concepts of the UCP Directive within national systems of private law, notably contract and tort law. Did the UCP Directive have a direct or indirect impact on these areas of law? Following the analysis in paras 4 to 6, the relationship between the UCP Directive and various specific EU rules pertaining to advertising, marketing and sales and after-sales processes could be further explored as well. For instance, the 'division of labour' between the UCP Directive on the one hand and the Consumer Rights Directive and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive is far from clear. To what extent do these three Directives interact, converge or clash? Finally, an issue also worthy of more extensive research was addressed in para 8, namely the limits and limitations of the information paradigm as one of the main pillars for EU consumer policies. The UCP Directive relies heavily on this paradigm but simultaneously offers specific protection to certain categories of vulnerable consumers such as the elderly and children deemed worthy of more protection than the 'ordinary average consumer'. It seems that the theoretical and empirical backbone of the UCP Directive are in need of fortification on this point. Therefore, comprehensive reflection on what makes these consumers vulnerable and whether the law can realistically address the resulting matters is due. 
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